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Abstract
Reciprocal behavior was often explained by perception of fairness derived from
either agents’ intention or distributional outcome. In this paper, we demon-
strated that fairness perception depended on the evaluability of the partner’s
type. We conducted experiments to investigate how workers formed fairness per-
ception on the employers. We found inconsistency in fairness evaluation in the
two simulated worker-employer relations; workers derived fairness by comparing
own wage with market wage in a one shot interaction, but workers derived fair-
ness based on current and previous wage when interacting with same employer.
The reversal of fairness perception suggested the role of evaluability of partners’
attribute in effort decision among workers.
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1 Introduction
Reciprocity is often invoked to explain the cooperative tendency between agents
in economic interactions. Agents exhibit reciprocal response to perceived kind-
ness and unkindness; in response to friendly actions agents are frequently much
nicer and cooperative and when faced with hostile actions agents behave much
more uncooperative (Fehr and Ga¨chter.,2000; Falk and Fischbacher.,2006). Fair-
ness perception can be traced to either distributional or intentional fairness.
In ultimatum game for example, distributional unfairness is often rejected by
the responders (Gu¨th et al., 1982; Dawes and Thaler., 1988; Camerer and
Thaler.,1988). The theoretical models by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton
and Ockenfels (2000) assume agents exhibit behavior based on fair outcome. In
addition to distributional fairness, another class of research emphasize on fair-
ness intentions as a major role in human behavior (Rabin.,1993; Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger.,2004; Falk and Fischbacher.,2006; Falk et al.,2008).
The focus of this paper is on the impact of cognitive factors on the perception
of fairness. Based on easy to evaluate one’s attribute, the perception on fairness
may be different from the perception when one’s attribute is difficult to evaluate.
In a two persons one shot interaction, one party may evaluate another party’s
kindness based on kindness exhibited by other players in the market. But if
the interaction is repetitive and both parties share the same history of actions,
agents involved may evaluate kindness based on previous actions of the same
player. In the former, the true type of the partner is not easily evaluated as
the interaction is one shot, agents thus reciprocate based on average actions in
the market. In the latter, the difficulty to evaluate attribute ( the true type
of partner) becomes easy to evaluate. Therefore, the formation of fairness is
influenced by relative kindness in one shot interaction and by absolute kindness
in repeated interaction.
Past research that found the preference reversal exhibited above, explained
that it is caused by evaluability of choices (Hsee et al.,1999; Hsee.,1996 ) by
attribute ambiguity (Loewenstein et al.,1993) and by dependency of attribute
(Nowlis and Simonson.,1997). In this paper, we adopt evaluability hypothesis
and attribute ambiguity to explain the formation of fairness perception in the
two set-ups. Paper which is very similar to our analysis is Blout and Bazerman
(1994) who found that agents formed the perception differently in separate
evaluation mode and simultaneous evaluation mode. When agents were asked
to make choices in a two separate conditions; (a) to choose to work when payoff
was $7 for all workers and (b) to choose to work when payoff was $8 or $10,
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more agents chose equal payoff than unequal payoff. However, more agents chose
unequal but higher payoff when the choices were presented simultaneously.
In the present paper, we test the evaluability hypothesis in a gift exchange
game. Instead of limiting the choices to only equal or only unequal payoff in
separate evaluation mode as in Blout and Bazerman, agents in the worker-
employer relation are free to make choices between relative or absolute fairness.
This causes the interaction to be more complex as agents have to choose between
own wage or market wage to form perception of fairness. Conducting the test
in a true worker-employer exchange also allows us to learn the role of attribute
ambiguity and evaluability hypothesis in explaining fairness perception. For
example, the workers cannot tell the true reciprocal type of employer in the one
shot treatment. If the hypothesis is true, workers should evaluate fairness based
on market wage, and if workers can tell in the repeated interaction, workers will
reciprocate based on own wage.
We conducted three experimental treatments to test the hypothesis. The
first treatment Stranger is a benchmark treatment to the second treatment
Stranger with market wage. Workers in the Stranger were not expected to
exhibit reciprocal behavior as the interaction between worker and employer was
one shot and workers did not know the market wage. Workers in the second
treatment were expected to reciprocate to relative payoff. As workers could
not evaluate the reciprocal type of the employers they are dealing with, they
compare own wage with market wage to evaluate the employers. The reversal
occurs if the evaluation was based on the comparison between current own wage
and previous own wage. In the third treatment, Partner with market wage,
workers interacted with the same employers. The difficult to evaluate attribute,
the type of employer, dominates the evaluation; workers value absolute fairness
more than relative fairness.
The paper is organized as; section two illustrate the experimental design and
procedures of the three treatments. Section three starts with the overall results
based on the comparison of the treatments followed by more detail analysis of
individual treatment. Section four concludes the paper.
2 Experimental design and procedures
Following Ga¨chter and Falk (2002) we model the worker-employer relation as
gift exchange. It is a typical sequential game with employer moves first to offer
a wage level to a worker. In second stage, the worker can decide on whether
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to accept or reject the offer. The decisions are known to the partners only. If
it is rejected, both players earn zero profit for the round. In total there are 10
rounds of interaction. If the worker accepts the offer, he has to decide on how
much to work for the employer.
In the experiment, both players know the profit function of other player. The
profit function of the employer is determined by,
pi = (υ − w)e (1)
where υ refers to some exogenously given value. w is wage offered to a worker
and e is effort level exerted by the worker.
A worker’s payoff is the difference between the wage (w) and the incurred
effort costs C(e), minus the fixed travel cost of 20 experimental money:
U = w − C(e)− 20 (2)
In the experiment, we set υ = 120, and wage offer has to be integer number
from 20 to 120 experimental money. The effort level and the associated costs
are exhibited as in table 1.
Effort 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
C(e) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18
Table 1: Effort levels and the associated costs
Upon entering the experimental lab, the subjects were randomly assigned
to the role of “firm” and “worker” and each was assigned randomly to a cu-
bicle. After the role was determined, they were separated into two different
rooms. The “workers” and the “firms” were then given about 7 minutes to read
the instructions, which included a set of questions to calculate the payoff of
both worker and firm. The experimenter then announced the procedures dur-
ing the experiment and answered to the questions raised. The experiment was
conducted in an economic experimental lab in School of Social Sciences, Uni-
versiti Sains Malaysia. The experiment was programmed and conducted with
the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).
The three treatments are explained as the following;
1. Stranger. The subjects were randomly paired with an anonymous partner.
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Each subject was matched with different partner after each round. After each
round, the subjects were given the information about his payoff and his partner’s
payoff. After this the subjects proceeded to next round.
The treatment provided a benchmark to compare with Stranger with market
wage treatment to test for absolute and relative fairness effect.
2. Stranger with market wage. The interaction is similar to Stranger, but the
players knew the information about market wage.
In this treatment, the subjects could not tell the true reciprocal type of
the employers as each period they were paired with different partner. Hence,
the subjects faced the choices to accept either an equal pay or unequal pay
conditions. Workers also can compare current own wage with previous own
wage.
We predict that effort should be higher in the equal pay than in the unequal
pay condition and the workers value relative fairness more than absolute fairness
when deciding on effort level. Relation between effort and relative wage ratio
(Waget − AverageWaget−1) should be positive.
3. Partner with market wage. The treatment was similar to the Stranger
with market wage, but a worker was paired with the same employer throughout
the treatment.
In this treatment, the subjects faced with two types of information; change
of absolute wage and equal or unequal payoff. We predict workers would value
absolute wage more than relative wage.
3 Results
Table 2 describes the overall effort levels for different treatments. The mean
effort level is reported for each quartile of wage level from 20 to 120. The
data demonstrate that mean effort rises with wage levels in both treatments
Partner with market wage and Stranger, but the correlation is weak in treatment
Stranger with market wage.
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the response of workers to
relative wage. The bottom half of the table shows the effort levels in response
to different levels of relative wage. The market wage is a reference wage level
against which the workers compare with his own wage. The difference of own
wage and market wage is denoted by the relative ratioWage/MarketWage, and
effort level falls into different quartile of the ratio shows the response of workers
to the relative wage. For example, in table 2, the average effort in the lowest
4
quartile of relative wage ratio is 0.1 in Stranger with market wage. Reading
down from lowest to highest quartile of relative wage in table 2 shows the effort
levels increase with relative wage. When the interaction is repetitive in Partner
with market wage, workers consistently respond higher own wage with higher
effort level.
The workers’ responses are shown in the OLS regression in Table 3, which
shows both the effects of own wage and relative wage on effort levels. Table 3
focuses on workers’ responses in which effort is the dependent variable. Column
1 shows the effect of own wage to the effort level in Stranger. The effect of own
wage on effort is consistent across all levels of wage and is highly significant. In
Stranger with market wage, if workers are inequality averse, high relative wage
should encourage high effort level. Column 2 shows positive relation between
effort and relative wage while own wage effect turns to negative and less sig-
nificant when making decision on effort level. However, the effect of relative
wage is negative in Partner with market wage as in column 3 when compared
with effect of own wage. To investigate the effect of own wage and relative wage
on effort level, simple F-test reveals that workers value own wage more than
relative wage with p-value of 0.0000.
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Table 3: OLS regression of effort response to wage
Treatment Stranger Stranger with Partner with
market wage market wage
Own wage 0.0060*** -0.0263* 0.0100***
Wage
in range:
20− 45 0.2108 -0.0093 -0.1193
46− 70 0.0924** -0.0377 0.2456***
71− 95 0.2445** -0.1511 0.4511***
96− 120 0.3750 -0.3300 0.7233***
Relative wage 1.293702** -0.486
Period effect Insignificant Insignificant Significant
Worker effect Significant Insignificant Significant
R square 0.5754 0.3356 0.5229
F(9,179)=0.51 F(12, 91) = 0.97 F(10, 75) = 2.55
Note:
-The explanatory variables Wage in Range are dummies in the regression. Wage in range
20− 45 is the constant in the regressions.
-Relative wage is denoted as Waget/MarketWaget−1
-*** is 1% s.l., ** 5% and * 10%.
We will investigate the influence of relative and own wage on workers in the
two treatments; Stranger with market wage and Partner with market wage.
3.1 Stranger market wage treatment
When the interaction is one shot, workers value relative wage more than own
wage; the effort responds to relative wage. Based on Table 2, the effort level
when wage is in the range 20 − 45 is significantly lower than effort levels in
46− 70, 71− 95 and 96− 120 combined (p=0.067, t-test). However, the effect
diminishes when employers offer higher wage level; the effort in 96− 120 is not
significantly higher than effort in 46 − 70 and 71 − 95 combined. When we
investigate the effect of relative wage, effort is consistently higher when own
wage is higher than market wage. Effort level in 1.59 − 2.17 is significantly
higher than effort in 0.43− 1 and 1.01− 1.58 combined.
Table 4 shows individual workers’ responses to own wage and relative wage.
Only one worker reciprocates high own wage with higher effort, while five work-
ers react to high relative wage with higher effort level.
The reciprocal tendency among workers towards relative wage information
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suggests the perception of fair treatment is more towards relative fairness rather
than absolute fairness. This is no surprise as when workers cannot tell the true
reciprocal type of the employer, workers will compare own wage with market
wage to reveal the true type of the employer.
In the next section, we allow workers to know the reciprocal type of employer
through repetition. We intend to learn how workers react to absolute and rela-
tive fairness when the information is common between workers and employers.
Table 4: Respones of individual workers to Own Wage and Relative Wage
worker no No of e =0.1 Corr(w,e) Corr(r,w)
1 8 0.565 0.7246**
2 6 0.6215 0.7303**
3 9 0.4805 0.4108
4 9 -0.1158 0
5 9 0.2372 0.4108
6 10 0 0
7 8 0.5588 0.5175*
8 7 0.0718 -0.5249
9 8 0.3133 0
10 5 0.6670** 0.5597*
11 9 0.2566 0.1369
12 6 0.5899 0.6938**
13 5 -0.1197 0.1009
Note:
- Corr is Spearman Rank Correlation Coeffiecient.
-e is effort
-w is wage and r =Waget −AverageWaget−1.
-** is 5% s.l. and * is 10% s.l.
3.2 Repeated market wage treatment
When the worker-employer relation shares the same common history, workers
reciprocate more to own wage rather than relative wage. Based on Table 2, the
exerted effort levels when wage falls in the category 71−95 and 96−120 combined
are significantly higher than effort in 20−45 or 46−70. And when wage is within
46−70 workers respond with 0.3959 which is significantly higher than effort when
employer offers 20 − 45. However, higher relative wage does not induce higher
effort level; effort in 1.39−1.73 is not significantly higher than effort in 1.06−1.38
wage category. On average, Spearman Rank Correlation reveals the relation
between wage-effort is 0.6632 (p=0.0000) compared to 0.4331(p=0.0000) for
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relative wage-effort.
Individual worker analysis also reveals that absolute fairness is valued more
than relative fairness among workers. Table 5 reports the responses of workers
to own wage and relative wage. Almost all of the workers react to absolute
fairness and only few workers react to comparison income between own and
relative wage.
Table 5: Respones of individual workers to Own Wage and Relative Wage
worker no no of e=0.1 Corr(w,e) Corr(r,e)
1 1 0.9147*** 0.8152***
2 2 0.6829** 0.3782
3 3 0.5871* 0.6325*
4 0 0.7502*** 0.7591***
5 0 0.9178*** -0.5791
6 1 0.9969*** 0.8536***
7 0 0.9138*** 0.3286
8 0 0.8944*** 0.2291
9 0 0.6440** 0.6295*
10 0 0.5231 0.8645***
11 2 0.8985*** 0.5255
Note:
- Corr is Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient.
-e is effort
-w is wage and r =Waget −AverageWaget−1.
-** is 5% s.l. and * is 10% s.l.
4 Conclusion
We conducted experimental test to investigate the influence of relative and
absolute fairness on workers’ reciprocal responses. Reciprocity was tested in
the two types of environment; when the worker-employer relation is random and
one shot compared to when the relation is random and repeated. Workers faced
the evaluability problem in the former as they always interacted with different
employer. Whereas in repeated interaction, the attribute of the employers was
easy to be evaluated based on historical offers. The evaluability of the type
of employers renders different fairness formation among workers; workers who
faced the evaluability problem derived fairness from the comparison payoff, and
workers who did not face the problem formed fairness perception based on
absolute payoff.
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